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POLICY PROBLEMS OF SMOKING AND HEALTH
Recent litigation raises an interesting question of legal
policy: should the cigarette industry pay plaintiffs for injuries
caused by smoking without reference to whether the product is
inferior to that which is generally supplied by all competitors?
This Comment will explore general arguments for and
against curbs on the cigarette industry; consider available tort
theories; evaluate the major cigarette cancer cases; and offer
suggestions as to the preferable policy with alternative means
of implementing it.
PROS AND CONS

In 1964 the Surgeon General reported, "Cigarette smoking
is a health hazard of sufficient importance in the United States
to warrant appropriate remedial action."',
The basic argument for governmental attack is one of public health. One might contend that smoking and health is a
private, not public, problem. However, the prevalence of lung
cancer, emphysema, bronchitis, and heart disease and the statistical evidence linking these diseases with cigarette smoking
have prompted the "public" classification. 2 Even cigarette-health
litigation initiated by private persons falls into the public category, because liability of a cigarette manufacturer will be a
public sanction against the product. Thus the "remedial action"
can be judicial as well as executive and legislative.
The argument against governmental action is largely one of
individual freedom." How far should the legitimate governmental concern for public health be extended into an area of
private choice? The decision to smoke is as personal as the
choice of foods. Today, however, we unquestionably accept government's intervention aimed at eliminating impure foods.
Cigarette manufacturers themselves have been subject to like
sanctions when their products were adulterated. 4 Because the
1. 111 CONG. REc. 13892 (1965) (remarks of Sen. Magnuson).
2. See 111 CONG. REC. 13900-13902 (1965) (remarks of Senator Moss).
3. 111 CONG. REC. 13918 (1965) (remarks of Senator Ervin). The Senator
quotes from a Wall Street Journal editorial entitled, "Can Government Break All
Our Bad Habits?" which suggests that a thorough anti-smoking campaign would
inject the federal government into matters of purely personal behavior and private
decisions.
4. Block v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 162 Misc. 325, 296 N.Y.S. 922
(1937) (piece of razor 'blade in cigarette). Judgment for plaintiff was reversed
for lack of privity. See note 21 infra, and accompanying text.
Exploding cigarettes formed bases for inferences of negligence in Liggett &

[535]

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXlX

present problem is grounded on the idea that the ordinary cigarette is unsafe, it is more pointedly individual and would seem
to call for strong evidence of popular consent to restraints. Governmertal action can range from the direct prohibition of smoking or of cigarette production, to mere recognition and publicity
of the health problem. Somewhere between these two would be
imposition of financial penalties on the tobacco industry with
the remedial intent of pricing cigarettes out of reach of at least
some segments of the smoking public. The harsher the penalties, the more likelihood of achieving indirect prohibition, and
the more compelling the reasons to seek representation of popular views through legislative vote.
In addition to the public health-individual choice considerations, economic factors must be faced. The known "facts" concerning cigarette induced diseases, though still speculative, are
sufficiently alarming to provoke the question, "Who should be
paying the costs ?" The choice of answers is limited. The status
quo compels the individual victim to bear the costs, in which
case the general public pays at least a percentage through the
media of charity hospitals, public health services, social security,
welfare programs, and the like. Or the cigarette manufacturer
can be made to pay the costs, in which case the smoking public
will pay through increased prices. Neither solution seems ideal,
which suggests the need to search for a compromise.
It is doubtful that the status quo will remain. 5 Although there
6
is still considerable doubt as to cause-in-fact of lung cancer
there are enough indicia to support an argument for the imposition of products liability. The fundamental idea of enterprise liability, that a producer should pay the costs of damage
caused by his defective product, has connotations of unjust enMyers Tobacco Co. v. De Lape, 109 F.2d 598 (9th Cir. 1940) ; Lindner v. LiggettMyers Tobacco Co., 23 N.Y.S.2d 923 (1940) ; Meditz v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco
Co., 167 Misc. 176, 3 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1938).
5. That the general public pays some costs of the diseases involved in the
smoking-health problem hardly needs elaboration; contraction of the diseases is
not keyed to the victim's ability to pay. Lung cancer kills 47,000 people a year in
this country. As early as 1965 the Public Health Service estimated that some
300,000 people a year die prematurely in this country as a result of one disease or
another associated with cigarette smoking. See 111 CoNG. REc. 13903 (1965) (remarks of Senator Kennedy of New York).
McNiece & Thornton, Is the Law of Negligence Obsolete?, 26 ST. JoIIN's L.
REV. 255, 258-59 (1952) : "The theory of rugged individualism in negligence law,
as in other realms of human existence, had yielded, for good or ill, to the theory
of what might be called, paradoxically enough, 'social individualism' . . . a process
of adjustment between individuals in which society has a vital interest."
6. 111 CONG. REC. 13896 (1965) (remarks of Senator Morton).
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richment.7 But is enterprise liability, as we know it in relation
to other products, the best answer available at present?
The economics of enter.prise liability is based on the predictability of the percentage of defective products that reaches
the market. The producer includes the costs of judgment payments in his pricing calculations so that the consumers who
buy his product indirectly pay for damages to the few who are
actually injured.8
Since the "ordinary" cigarette rather than the defective
cigarette is the alleged health hazard, the manufacturer is deprived of two elements of the usual enterprise liability formula:
first, the ability through careful production methods of keeping the damages at a minimum percentage; and, second, predictability of the percentage. Faced with virtually unlimited
damage awards for cancer, emphysema, and possibly heart disease, the cigarette manufacturer would find it literally impossible to include liability allowances in his pricing; and a pack
of cigarettes might soon be priced out of reach.
Comparing the plight of the cigarette manufacturer to the
disease toll,9 one is likely to retort, "So what?" But before this
comparison is allowed to lead to a conclusive policy decision
against the cigarette industry, it should be pointed out that the
number of persons who would be economically affected-by a
restraint on the cigarette industry at least equals the number
medically affected by smoking. Tobacco is a major United
States industry.1- Tobacco taxes provide major support to government on all levels." Thus those who would discount all resistance to imposing liability or other restrictions on the cigarette industry as unduly engendered by a powerful cigarette lobby
7. Santor v. A. & M. Kara-Gheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 65, 207 A.2d 305, 312
(1965) : "The purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of injuries or
damage . . . resulting from defective products is borne by the makers of the
products who put them in the channels of trade, rather than by the injured or
damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect themselves .... "
8. Morris, EnterpriseLiability and the Actuarial Process--The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554 (1961).
9. See note 5 supra.
10. More than $7 billion is spent for cigarettes annually. About 750,000 farm
families grow tobacco in 21 states; it is the country's fifth largest cash crop. Tobacco products factories number about 500 in a total of 30 states, giving direct
employment to more than 96,000 people. Distribution involves some 4,500 wholesalers, 1.5 million retailers, and in the United States more than 1.5 million businesses share in the tobacco trade supplying equipment, materials, and the like.
See 111 CONG. REC. 13898 (1965) (Statement by Senator Bass.)
11. Id.: "The Federal Government collects more than $2 billion annually in
tobacco excise taxes, State governments about $1.2 billion, and municipal governAbout half of what the consumer spends for a
ments more than $50 million ....
package of cigarettes is paid to government treasuries."
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should realize that although the lobby exists for "selfish" reasons, it is a many-thousand-voiced selfishness.
A final economic argument is against judicial, rather than
legislative, imposition of liability and relates to potential dire

effects on other industries. Products that are "unavoidably
unsafe" and not "defective" per se are not now faced with liability. 12 If this policy is discarded and manufacturers of such
products as whiskey and candy are laid open to claims by cirrhosis and diabetes victims, our entire economic structure could
possibly be threatened.
The blood-hepatitis cases clearly reveal the judicial policyforming process. Blood used for life-saving transfusions sometimes carries a deleterious germ which causes the recipient of
the blood to contract hepatitis, a serious liver disease. The trend
in the courts has been to refuse liability, 13 based on the under-

lying consideration that it is impossible to detect the germ in
the blood before it is given in transfusion. 14 In the typical case
of blood-hepatitis, the court has been called upon to weigh the
need for the product and the good which is achieved by its use

against the seriousness and frequency of the risk involved. "IOne
authority explains that the courts must consider the possibility
that the plasma supplier firms might soon go out of that business rather than face enterprise liability. This would leave a
void in medical treatment much to the detriment of society. 16
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). See also note 23
infra and accompanying text.
13. Fischer v. Wilmington Gen. Hosp., 149 A.2d 749 (Del. 1959) (defendant
granted summary judgment on negligence charge even though there was a failure
to warn patient of possible danger) ; White v. Sarasota County Public Hosp. Bd.,
206 So.2d 19 (Fla. App. 1968) (transaction not classed as "sale"-so no cause
of action based on implied warranty of fitness) ; Hoder v. Sayet, 196 So.2d 205
(Fla. App. 1967) (Transfer of blood by hospital to patient is generally considered
a service rather than a "sale." However, summary judgment denied defendant hospital because commercial blood bank was involved in transfer.) ; Lovett v. Emory
Univ., Inc., 156 S.E.2d 923 (Ga. App. 1967) ; (general demurrer granted-no sale);
Jackson v. Muhlenberg Hosp., 96 N.J. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967) (court granted
summary judgment on strict liability and implied warranty issues because of lack
of testing available to defendant; denied summary judgment on express warranty
and negligence because disclaimer on 'bottle created an express warranty and it was
possible that plaintiff might prove lack of utmost care warranted) ; Payton v.
Brooklyn Hosp., 19 N.Y.2d 610 (N.Y. App. 1967) (plaintiff's claim of breach of
warranty in "sale" dismissed 'by trial court prior to jury trial).
14. Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial Blood Bank, 270 Minn. 151,
159, 132 N.W.2d 805, 811 (1965) ; "[I]t would be unrealistic to hold there is an
implied warranty as to qualities of fitness of human blood on which no medical or
"
scientific information can be acquired ..
15. See James, The Untoward Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550, 1558 (1966).
16. 2 L. FRUMER & Al. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16.03 (4) (1966).
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PLAINTIFF'S THEORIES

The cigarette-cancer plaintiff will base his case in negligence, warranty, strict liability in tort, or a combination thereof. 17 All of these theories are subject to manipulation in implementing policy decisions based upon the arguments discussed
earlier.
Unlike the victim of a contaminated-cigarette, the cancer
victim cannot assert that the cigarette was faultily made; it is
of standard quality. This lack of defective quality would defeat
a claim of negligence in production. However, if policy considerations dictate liability, the courts could readily find negligence by saying that the mere putting of the carcinogenic cigarette on the market, accompanied by advertisements and promotion, breaches a duty owed the buying public by the manufacturer. s
Similar results can be achieved with warranty. The duty in
warranty is directly tied to the representations made in marketing. When the manufacturer's statement is intended to assure
the purchaser against the harm which he later suffered, the case
will be one of express warranty. 9 Implied warranty is based
on either statements or actions by the manufacturer. It is plausible for the courts to maintain that the cigarette manufacturer
who places his cigarettes for sale is warranting their "wholesomeness" and that this warranty is breached when the smoker
falls victim to lung cancer. But, it is also plausible that a cigarette manufacturer warrants only that his product is smokable,
that is, properly made, with good, uncontaminated tobacco. The
fact that it may cause injury to some susceptible persons does
not lead to the conclusion that the manufacturer is an absolute
insurer against all possible ills of the smoker.20
Despite criticism, 2 ' various forums have insisted on confusing warranty in tort with warranty in commercial sale--the
17. Rossi, The Cigarette-CanerProblem: Plaintiff's Choice of Theories Explored, 34 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1961).
18. See note 7 supra. The exploding cigarette cases indicate a willingness on
the part of courts to accept inferences of negligence from the mere fact of defect.
This thinking can be further extended to infer negligence from the mere fact of
resultant injury.
19. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 359 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965).
See Hamon v. Digliani, 148 Conn. 710, 174 A.2d 294 (1961), in which the court
overruled demurrer to both express and implied warranty in advertising claims of
a soap manufacturer.
20. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963)
RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 402A (1965).

21. See Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69

YALE

L.J. 1099 (1960).
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latter being subject to various contract rules which have grown
up around it. -2 The theory of strict liability in tort was developed
as a staple substitute for warranty, an escape hatch for courts
which felt bound by contract rules. 23 The Restatement of Torts
Second, Section 402A, adopts the rule of strict liability in tort.
This is an extension of a former Restatement position which had
included strict liability in tort for sellers of "food for human
consumption or other products for intimate bodily use" but for
no other products. Cigarettes were considered among the "other
products" included in the earlier exception and their manufacturers were thus subject to liability only for impurities.
If a court favors denying the cigarette manufacturer's liability, it can find support in the Restatement that "ordinary"
cigarettes (those without some foreign substance) do not come
within the definitions set forth in Section 402A. Ordinary cigarettes are not considered "defective" or "unreasonably dangerous to the user." This would be a valid refusal to extend liability
to a manufacturer for an "unavoidably unsafe" product.
However, the Restatement is meant to be merely a statement
of what the law is, not law-making itself. A court jealous of its
own policy-making prerogative could disregard the Restatement
position and find the cigarette manufacturer liable on the
ground that "defective" should be synonymous with any injury24
causing elements in cigarettes, unavoidable or not.
DEFENSES

In view of the fact that three major cases2 5 have affirmed
the causal connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, manufacturers had best labor for other defenses. Cause is
22. Among the contract rules referred to are: reliance on the part of consumer; representation or undertaking on the part of seller; Uniform Sales Act;
Uniform Commercial Code; notice to seller of breach; privity and validity of contract; disclaimers. See RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment (m)
(1965).
23. 2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A (4) (a) (1966):
"If a court imposes strict warranty liability irrespective of contract and sales rules,
then strict liability in warranty and tort are synonymous ....
Many courts have
been unwilling to impose strict warranty liability where one or another contract requirement was not present. Strict liability in tort offers to such courts an opportunity to circumvent or avoid the precedents that have impeded the development of
strict liability in the products liability area."
24. See note 48 infra, and accompanying text.
25. See note 42 inlra.
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not an issue to be belittled in any future cigarette cancer case,
as it remains a major point upon which the minds of reasonable men can differ. 26 For purposes of the present discussion
though, it will be assumed that the cancer plaintiffs can and
will satisfy the burden of proof of cause-in-fact.
One possible defense is assumption of the risk, since tobacco's
use has long been considered hazardous to health.2 7 Regarding
this defense, it should be noted that the differences between contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and misuse of the
product can be misleading. Some courts consider contributory
negligence broad enough to apply in warranty as well as in
negligence cases. 2

1

Other courts are not content with the negli-

gence term and insist on differentiations.29 The failure to discover a defect, or to anticipate the possibility of one, does not
26. Note, 13 W. RES. L. REV. 782 (1962) takes the view that causation in a
cigarette cancer case is a jury question whenever there is reliable medical testimony presented to establish the causal relation.
As early as 1604 the use of tobacco was termed "[a] custome Lothsome to
the eye, hatefull to the Nose, harmefull to the braine, daungerous to the Lungs ..
"
The quotation is from J. ROBERT, THE STORY OF TOBACCO IN AMERICA 6 (1949).
He points out, id. :"Most famous of all anti-tobacco tracts is Counterblaste to
Tobacco, published in 1604 anonymously though soon known as the king's (James
I of England) work."
27. In the same book, Robert notes that in an essay entitled "Observation upon
the influence of the Habitual use of Tobacco upon Health, Morals and Property,"
Dr. Benjamin Rush blamed tobacco use for the death of a patient who "died of a
Dropsy under my care in the year 1780 .... " Id. at 106. In the period from 1830
to 1860, "the gentlemen who thought the pipe loaded with 'brimstone furnished an
astounding list of diseases caused by tobacco. Dr. Joel Shew carefully itemized
eighty-seven such ailments, the first 'being insanity, and the eighty-seventh cancer.
In between were such deviations from normalcy as delirium tremens, epilepsy, slavering, hemorrhoids, rheumatism, gout, perverted sexuality, and impotency ..
"
1d. at 108. On October 23, 1945, Dr. Alton Ochsner of New Orleans, regional
medical director of the American Cancer Society, announced that "there is a distinct parallelism between the incidence of cancer of the lung and the sales of cigarettes ....
Id. at 275.
28. Maiorino v. Weco Products, 45 N.J. 570, 574, 214 A.2d 18, 20 (1965):
"[T]he well known principle of contributory negligence in its broad sense is sufficiently comprehensive to encompass all the variant notions expressed in the cited
cases as a basis for refusing plaintiff a recovery when his own lack of reasonable
care joined or concurred with the defect in the defendant's product as a proximate
cause of this mishap and his injury."
See also Dallison v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1962) ; Hill
v. Harbor Steel & Supply Corp., 374 Mich. 194, 132 N.W.2d 54 (1965) ; Gardner
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 267 Minn. 505, 127 N.W.2d 557 (1964) ; Nelson v. Anderson, 245 Minn. 445, 72 N.W.2d 861 (1955)
Missouri Bag Co. v. Chemical
Delinting Co., 214 Miss. 13, 58 So.2d 71 (1952) Finks v. Viking Refrigerators,
235 Mo. App. 679, 147 S.W.2d 124 (1940).
29. Rasmus v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 158 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Iowa 1958) (contributory negligence not involved in actions for breach, of warranty) ; Hardman v.
Helene Curtis Indus., Inc., 48 I1. App. 2d 42, 198 N.E.2d 681 (1964) ("ordinary
use" within meaning of warranty of merchantibility) ; Nelson v. Union Wire Rope
Corp., 39 Ill. App. 2d 73, 187 N.E.2d 425 (1963) (warranty case involved issue of
use for the purpose intended). See note 45 infra, and accompanying text.
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make the plaintiff negligent, whereas an unreasonable use of
a product after discovery of the defect and the danger will3 °
Basically, the defense of assumption of the risk as applied
in a significant line of products liability cases is founded on the
premise that the plaintiff knew of the danger but took the risk
regardless of the possible consequences.3 1 It has been suggested
to cases in which the plaintiff truly
that this defense be limited
"appreciates the danger, '8 2 though this suggestion should not
imply need for exacting knowledge of possible injury. Thus it
seems logical that the plaintiff-user of a warranted product
would be charged with assuming the risk of injury if he used
although the resultant injury
the product knowing of danger
33
proved to be quite bizarre.
Analytically, the theory fits quite neatly. Only the most
naive plaintiff (perhaps the infant or incompetent) could claim
complete lack of knowledge of possible harms that can ensue
the smoking habit. The cancer victim should not be able to avoid
the bar to recovery by asserting that although he did know that
smoking could seriously impair his health, he did not expect
cancer.
Practically, there are two imp edimeirs _toassumption-of
the risk being used as a satisfactory defense by the cigarette
industry. The first is the question of proof. The cigarette manufacturers are caught in a dilemma. To prove this defense, the
manufacturers themselves must show that the plaintiffs knew,
not of the cancer-causing aspects of smoking, but that smoking is
injurious to health in general. This would be an active assertion that their own product is unhealthful. If successful the industry's legal departments could mark the file "Winner," but
the public relations men would be crying, "Loser!" Thus the
cigarette manufacturers must weigh the economic effects on
30. 2 L.

FRUMER

& M.

FRIEDMAN,

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§

16.01 (1966). See also

Comment, Products Liability-The Expansion of Fraud, Negligence and Strict
Tort Liability, 64 Micii. L. REV. 1350 (1966).
31. Cases involving negligent design have severely limited recovery where the
danger was patent or obvious. See Kolstad v. Ghidotty, 212 Cal. App. 2d 228, 28
Cal. Rptr. 123 (1963) ; Harris v. Spencer-Harris Tea Co., 244 Miss. 84, 140 So.2d
558 (1962) ;Jones v. Klachkin, 22 Misc. 2d 631, 199 N.Y.S.2d 155 (1960) ;Campo
v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
32. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 7.02 (1.966) criticizes
the cases cited in the preceding note on the grounds that a peril may be patent but
still not appreciated, and without such appreciation of danger recovery should be
allowed.
33. See Hagy v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 122 Cal. App. 2d 361, 265 P.2d
86 (1954), wherein the court applied the familiar principle that defendant takes
the plaintiff as he finds him. Plaintiff recovered for "awakening" of cancer of the
larynx by chemicals negligently escaping from defendant's plant.
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the industry of either paying the costs of liability for cancer
3 4
victims or downgrading the public image of their products.
The second impediment is the medical theory of addiction. 5
If it is legally provable that smoking is addictive, then the plaintiff may have the possibility of claiming that he began to smoke
only with the thought of trying it out-hardly assuming a risk
of great injury from a few experimental smokes-but soon
became "hooked" on the habit. This would seem to be valid
rebuttal to assertions that he assumed the risk of cancer or
other great injury.
Chronology becomes significant in the assmption of the risk
defense. Yesterday's plaintiff was a victim who began smoking
before the cancer scare and relies on ignorance of the danger.
Presumably the knowledge of today's smoker may prevent his
recovery unless he can prove addiction. In the future, if addiction is actually proved and publicized, even tomorrow's plaintiff
may not be able to claim lack of knowledge of the inherent
risks-he will assume the risk not only of cancer, but of addiction, too. Thus the success of a plaintiff seems limited by his
place in time. However, a supposition so vague seems a poor
answer to an industry's concern over potentially devastating
judgments.
When mention is made of possible defenses, the mind is likely
to turn to the waining-on cigarette packages: "Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health."36 This writer
would hazard a prediction that this package warning, if it ever
were to become an issue in a cigarette-cancer case, would be legally ineffectual as a defense. This prediction is based on the"duty to
warn" cases, the cases involving food and drug legislation, and
the nature of the warning itself. In the products liability field,
the manufacturer is bound to inform the potential user of dangerous propensities inherent in the product itself or of special
instructions necessary for the safe and proper use of his product.3 7 That the manufacturer failed in either requirement has
been held negligence, without proof of further lack of care in
34. See note 10 supra, and accompanying text.
35. Kessler, More Than a Habit?, The Wall Street Journal, July 1, 1968, at
1: "[S]ome research physicians and other scientists are beginning to talk about
cigarette smoking in a new context-as a genuine 'addiction' like that induced by
such drugs as morphine and heroin."
36. Such warning is required by the Federal Cigarette Labeling Act of 1965.
37. See Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and the Duty
To Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145 (1955).
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the manufacturing process causing a defective product.38 How-

ever, the fact that there was a warning of sorts did not prevent
recovery when it was found the warning was inadequate or too
limited in scope.3 9 Similarly, compliance with requirements estab-

lished for warnings by food and drugs statutes has not been40

per se sufficient to exonerate the producer from liability.
Finally, warning on the cigarette packages has been required by
Act of Congress. Opinions expressed in the congressional debates
prior to passage indicated that the purpose of the warning re-

quirement was not connected with possible tort duties of the
manufacturers.41
MAJOR CIGARETTE CASES
Three cases have dominated the cigarette-cancer litigation
scene: Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Pritchardv. Lig-2
gett & Myers Tobacco Co., and Green v. American Tobacco Co.4
In Lartigue, the plaintiff based her claim on negligence and
breach of warranty. Defendants pleaded contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
court judgment for the defendant stating that the "scope" of
implied warranty did not include cigarettes which were uncontaminated.
38. Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754
(1963) (no defect in surface preparer, but warning was necessary because of
latent dangerous characteristics) ; Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So.2d 603 (Fla.
1958) (label contained no specific directions as to use for any particular purpose) ;
Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930) (statement that product was not designed for a particular use was not equivalent to
warning of hazard).
39. Boyl v. California Chemical Co., 221 F. Supp. 669 (D. Ore. 1963) (inadequate warning on weed killer) ; Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 149 So.2d
898 (Fla. App. 1963) (question of adequate warning on bulldozer) ; McLaughlin
v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407
(1962) (inadequate warning on emergency heat blocks).
40. Tampa Drug Co. v. Wait, 103 So.2d 603 (Fla. 1958) (minimum federal
requirements for labeling) ; Maize v. Atlantic Refining Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.2d
850 (1945) (label approved by Surgeon General would not pretermit imposition
of liability).
41. The purpose, rather, was "action" in response 'to the Surgeon General's
report. See notes 1-4 supra.
42. Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco, 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 134 F. Supp. 829 (W.D. Pa. 1955), reversed,
295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961) ; Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1968).
Although the writer has selected the above cases for emphasis, two other cases
are significant: Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (lower
court had properly instructed the jury that manufacturer's warranty did not cover
substance in manufactured products, harmful effects of which no human skill or
foresight could afford knowledge) ; Cooper v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 256
F.2d 464 (1st Cir. 1958) (summary judgment for defendant manufacturer was affirmed because no proof of advertisement containing claim that cigarettes were
healthful). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d Products Liability § 3 (1961).
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The Lartigue court seemed aware of the policy decision which
it was being asked to make, as illustrated by the following language: "The same public policy reasons which justify holding
a manufacturer to strict liability for food products apply to
cigarettes .... [C] ourts have applied the rule to foreign substances in cigarettes and chewing tobacco. [Cited cases omitted.] In all of these cases the injury was caused by a foreign
substance or by spoiled food. The risk of . . ... such injuries is
incident to the business ....Public policy demands that the burden of any accidental injuries caused by such products be placed
upon those who produce and market the products and know
the risks. The injuries from knowable risks are a cost of production for the industry to bear; they are passed on to consumers ....
But it is reasonable to draw a line somewhere: a manufacturer
of food products is not like one who keeps a tiger for a pet in
a crowded city. . . . Strict liability on the warranty of wholesomeness, without regard to negligence, 'does not mean that
goods are warranted to be foolproof or incapable of producing

injury.'

"43

This language evidences a distinct recognition of the policy
issue and demonstrates the court's decision not to place ordinary
cigarettes within the "defective" product category of Restate44
ment 402A.
In Pritchard,the Third Circuit Court of Appeals remanded 45
for a new trial on the grounds that the jury's finding the plaintiff smoker has assumed the risk was unsupported by the evidence. The court pointed out that assumption of the risk can be a
defense to breach of warranty, but contributory negligence cannot.
It felt the jury should have been instructed as to the differences
between assumption of the risk in its primary sense (identical
to contributory negligence) and its secondary sense (misuse of
a product or acceptance of a danger with knowledge of the
danger). The breach of warranty in Pritchardwas different
from Green and Lartigue in that it involved an alleged express
43. 317 F.2d 19, 36-37 (5th Cir. 1963).
44. The court in explanation interpolated other language indicating that strict
liability is to be applied only when damages are foreseeable. It is submitted that
foreseeability of harm is irrelevant to the issue of whether or not ordinary cigarettes are "defective." However, -this was Lartigue's only deviation toward confusion.
45. The court of appeals had earlier reversed the trial court's directed verdict
for the defendant, stating that the issues of breach of implied warranty of merchantability and of negligence vel non in the manufacturer's failure to conduct
sufficient tests to determine if the use of its product caused cancer were both for
the jury.
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warranty-a series of advertisements based on the non-harmfulto-health aspects of Chesterfield cigarettes. The court of appeals
could not accept the assumption of the risk defense offered by
the same manufacturer that had advertised that the danger
allegedly assumed by the plaintiff did not exist. Most notable
about the Pritchard case is the concurring opinion by Judge
Goodrich. Alluding to foods and drink that are potentially harmful to susceptible persons or dangerous if used in excess, such
as butter, salt, and whiskey, he indicated the manufacturers of
such products would not be liable for injuries caused by their
ingestion in the absence of assurances to the customer or impurities in the product. It is submitted that this view is correct. The
issue of assumption of the risk which occasioned another return
of the case to the lower court led the case on a tangent. Had
the court determined that it was simply contrary to public
policy to allow this defense in the face of an express warranty,
it could have been direct about the decision rather than require
the jury to become entangled in abstract definitions of assumption of the risk which it might find difficult, if not impossible,
to distinguish.
The history of Green v. American Tobacco Co. 46 is discouraging for anyone searching for definition of the cigarette manufacturer's duty to the public.
Green has been in litigation since December 1957. The first
jury trial ended in a general verdict for defendant, with special
interrogatories pertaining to cause and to foreseeability of the
cancer-causing qualities of cigarettes. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the verdict for defendant, but shortly thereafter decided to grant a petition for rehearing to allow certification of the question of scienter by the manufacturer to the Florida Supreme Court.4 7 The answer concluded there was no state
precedent for limiting liability because of unforeseeability of
defect.
46. 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968).
47. The question read: "Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer
and distributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty
...

when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not ..

. by the reason-

able application of human skill and foresight, have known that users of such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke from
such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?" 304 F.2d 70, 86 (5th Cir. 1962).
The Florida Supreme Court introduced its answer with this caution: "[T]he
question thus framed does not present for our consideration the issue of whether
the cigarettes which caused a cancer in this particular instance were as a matter
of law unmerchantable in Florida under the stated conditions, nor does it request
a statement of the scope of warranty implied in the circumstances of this case."
154 So.2d 169, 170 (Fla. 1963).
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Following certification to the Florida Supreme Court, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the former judgment for defendant on
the ground that, in light of the certification opinion, the district
court's instruction to the jury was erroneous. Despite a vigorous dissent, the majority felt it could not render judgment for
plaintiff on the issue of liability because "the jury has not made
any sufficient finding on the question of reasonableness, that is,
as to whether or not the cigarettes were 'reasonably fit and

wholesome.'

",48

The district court was cautioned not to re-litigate the issue
of cause already decided, but adhere to the issue of a reasonably fit and wholesome product 9 This second jury trial resulted
in another victory for defendant, which, in 1968, the Fifth Circuit again found necessary to reverse on the grounds that Florida
law now called for a finding of liability as matter of law. 5 0 The
1969 chapter of Green came after an en banc rehearing by the
Fifth Circuit's eleven judges. In a one-paragraph statement, the
majority simply held that the earlier jury ruling of no liability
because defendant could not have known the smoker would
develop cancer should stand.5 1
It is difficult to imagine a case more congested with extraneous issues than Green. The Fifth Circuit's change of mind in
granting the certification to the Supreme Court of Florida was
just the first step in a series of erroneous and unnecessary ones.
But even after the certification was made, it was error to call
for submission to the second jury of what should have been a
conclusion of law rather than of fact. It is submitted that the
Florida Supreme Court did not contemplate this result; in denying the knowledge-factor it was safe-guarding decisions in other
cases where knowledge of the manufacturer is immaterial.52
Further, the Florida Supreme Court did not contemplate its
language being used to extend the "scope" of warranty as
declared in Lartigue.
Thus the major cases are varied in approach and are for
48. 325 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1963).
49. By submitting the issue of whether or not the cigarettes were reasonably
fit and wholesome the court of appeals was placing a completely unrealistic burden
on the next jury and the -trial judge. flow were they to determine reasonable fitness without re-considering the testimony of expert witnesses, which was tantamount to re-litigation of medical cause-in-fact?
50. 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1968).
51. Morning Advocate, April 9, 1969, at 1, col. 3.
52. Sencer v. Carl's Markets, 45 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1950) (can of sardines defective) ; Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So.2d 476 (Fla. 1949) ; Blanton
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So.2d 313 (1944).

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXIX

the most part adept at skirting or confusing the issues. Lartigue
limits the "scope" of warranty to relieve the manufacturer of
liability for a product that is truly not defective. Pritchard has
become side-tracked on the semantics of defenses. Green has
vacillated between considering the manufacturer's human skill
and foresight controlling and not controlling. Hopefully the trend
just begun will not continue, but rather will be avoided by a
more realistic appreciation by the courts of their policy-forming
functions.
ALTERNATIVES

It seems desirable that the cigarette-health problem not
remain entirely in the judicial system for a case-by-case formulation of policy. In view of the arguments against curbs on the
cigarette industry, the courts seem to be the improper institution
for ultimate decision of the issue. Unlimited liability imposed
by juries can too easily lead to indirect prohibition, a matter for
popular decision. An industry as important as the tobacco industry needs a more studied and predictable method for bearing
its load of financial responsibility to the buying public. Finally,
an open-door to liability for "unavoidably unsafe" products is
too productive of dire economic effects on other industries.
However, this writer does see a need for the industry
to pay the costs of cigarette-linked diseases, and is in favor of
liability, but by means of a statutory scheme.
A striking parallel to the cigarette-cancer question was noted
earlier in the policy formulated for the blood-hepatitis cases.
Although the majority of cases have denied liability, there has
been some statutory policy-making in that area.
A few states have passed legislation to prevent the blood
suppliers from being held liable, but not without criticism:
"[I]n protecting one small group from strict liability in warranty, the statute opens the way for similar types of legislation
in behalf of other groups which can make equally appealing
arguments for protection . . . [I]t may be suggested that this
statute goes about the matter in the wrong way, by a 'shotgun'
approach eliminating all possibility of liability for breach of
warranty regardless of the circumstances. ' . 3 If liability-limiting
legislation is politically feasible for the blood problem, it is at
least possible for the cigarette problem, although there will prob53. 2 L. FRUMF & M.

FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY

§ 16.04(3) (b)

(1966).
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ably be more public opinion expressed against the cigarette
industry's interest than against the blood manufacturers'.
Tobacco and whiskey are often compared within the framework of cigarette-cancer discussion, but the fact that many states
have in the past tried cigarette-prohibition is often overlooked.
In 1915 nine states had cigarette-prohibition laws on the books,
54
although they were rarely enforced.
The tobacco-whiskey comparison may be suggestive of a
possible solution. A carry-over from whiskey prohibition days is
the Illinois Dram Shop Act. 5 The Act establishes a system "to
distribute a part of the inevitable costs of the human misery
and suffering that flows from, intemperate drinking among all
those who purchase intoxicants ....,,56
In short, it is legislatively
enacted enterprise liability. Connecticut has a similar act, and
both states subject the seller of liquor to liability without requiring proof that the sale was illegal or was made to a person
known to be intoxicated. Nineteen other states have Dram Shop
Acts, but they do require such proof.
The Illinois statute has not done away entirely with the
tort character of the award, since recovery is denied to the
person whose voluntary intoxication resulted in his own injury;
the injury must result from the sale of liquor.
However, the awards are limited, making this a controlled
liability similar to workmen's compensation. Overall recovery
cannot exceed $15,000 in case of a single injury by the intoxicated person or $20,000 for loss of support. The distinguishing
feature is that the Dram Shop awards more closely resemble
general damages, whereas compensation is usually geared to
loss of earning or capacity to earn. It is the limited liability
of the Dram Shop Act which makes it feasible for the liquor
sellers to carry protective insurance.
Similar legislation might very well serve all interests in the
cigarette-cancer problem. Knowing they are facing only a limited liability, the cigarette manufacturers would be able to
carry insurance to cover awards. In turn the cost of the insurance
could be passed on to all cigarette buyers in the cost of the
product. Yet the unfortunate lung cancer victim would not be
5
without assistance in paying his medical tolls. 7
54. See J.

ROBERT, THE STORY OF TOBACCO IN AMERICA 248 (1967).
55. ILL. REV. STAT.
135
56. W. MALONE & M. PLANT, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATIoN 68 (1963).

§

(1961).

57. See Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict
Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 376 (1965).
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CONCLUSION

Although this writer finds an affirmative answer to the
initial question of legal policy unavoidable, it must be a qualified answer. The cigarette industry should pay costs in public
health brought about through the use of tobacco, because this
is the most reliable way to distribute costs to the smoker and
relieve the non-smoker of the financial burden. Nevertheless,
the conflicting needs of the industry and disease victims can
be adjusted more effectively through legislative action. Available
tort theories are mere vehicles for policy decisions, and case
results will depend more on policy considerations than on legal
maneuvers. Although this is implicit in the cases reported to
date, each case reflects a rather myopic view of the entire cigarette-health problem. The reports illustrate the limitations of
handling this broad problem of public health through products
liability litigation alone.
Janis M. Lasseigne

